

# Countering Proliferation: The UK Global Threat Reduction Programme

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## Overview of presentation

- UK policy framework
- UK Global Threat Reduction Programme:
  - Scope
  - Implementation
  - International collaboration
  - Programme risks
  - Future challenges
- Conclusion

## The UK's National Security Strategy

“providing security for the nation and for its citizens remains the most important responsibility of government”

- A set of principles—including multilateralism
- Key security challenges—including terrorism; nuclear weapons, other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
- The UK's response—including the UK's Counter-Proliferation Strategy

## The UK's Counter-Proliferation Strategy

- **Dissuade** states from acquiring, developing, and contributing to the spread of WMD, and related materials and expertise
- **Detect** attempts by states, and terrorists, to develop or acquire this capability
- **Deny** access to WMD and the necessary materials, equipment, technology and expertise to develop them, while promoting commerce and technological development for peaceful purposes
- **Defend** our country, our citizens, our Armed Forces and our strategic interests from the threats posed by proliferation

## The UK's Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP)

- Important part of 'Deny' strand
- UK's largest cooperative counter-proliferation assistance programme, with an annual budget of around £36million
- Delivers UK contribution to the G8 Global Partnership established at Kananaskis in 2002
- FCO hold the policy lead, **DECC deliver the nuclear and radiological portfolio** (~90%) and MOD the chemical and biological programmes

## Nuclear and Radiological portfolio: current activities

- Management of spent nuclear fuel at Andreeva Bay, North West Russia—with EBRD, Norway, Sweden, Italy, EU TACIS
- Scientist Redirection in Russia and Former Soviet Union states (Closed Nuclear Cities Programme)
- Plutonium Reactor Shutdown in Aktau, Kazakhstan—joint programme with US Department of Energy (DOE)
- Nuclear and Radiological Security Programme

# Nuclear and Radiological Security Programme-scope

- Mostly a “first line of defence” programme
- Addresses technology, equipment, and cultural aspects of security
  - Physical protection upgrades at sites
  - Nuclear Security Workshops (now run in Russian and English)

## Nuclear and Radiological Security Programme-implementation

- Bilaterally—e.g. in Russia
- Multiple donors collaborating over RAD active spent sources facility in Ukraine
- With IAEA Office of Nuclear Security –on projects in Tajikistan, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Belarus—and scope will widen with the new UK contribution of £4M to Nuclear Security Fund
- With US DOE—in Kazakhstan, other Former Soviet Union states

## Programme risks

- Prioritisation
- Sustainability
- Political
- Financial
- Legal frameworks for collaboration
- Donor and beneficiary coordination
- Manageability within UK resources

## Challenges ahead

- Staying focussed on highest threats
- Completing existing programmes in Russia on agreed timescales, whilst widening scope
- Ensuring sustainability
- Evaluating impact—to demonstrate value for money and secure ongoing funding
- Managing expectations

## Conclusion

- Countering proliferation is a key objective of the UK National Security Strategy

[http://interactive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/documents/security/national\\_security\\_strategy.pdf](http://interactive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/documents/security/national_security_strategy.pdf)

- UK Global Threat Reduction Programme is supporting the delivery of effective nuclear and radiological security worldwide
- Collaboration with the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security and other international partners is critical to success
- Global Threat Reduction Programme Annual Report 2008 available at: <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file49982.pdf>